This paper focuses on the security assessment of electricity distribution networks (DNs) with vulnerable distributed energy resource (DER) nodes. The adversary model is a simultaneous compromise of DER nodes by strategic manipulation of generation setpoints. The loss to the defender (DN operator) includes loss of voltage regulation and cost of induced load control under supply-demand mismatch caused by the attack. A threestage defender-attacker-defender (DAD) game is formulated: in Stage 1, the defender chooses a security strategy to secure a subset of DER nodes; in Stage 2, the attacker compromises a set of vulnerable DERs and injects false generation setpoints; in Stage 3, the defender responds by controlling loads and non-compromised DERs. Solving this trilevel optimization problem is hard due to nonlinear power flows and mixed-integer decision variables. To address this challenge, the problem is approximated by a tractable formulation based on an -linear power-flow model. The set of critical DER nodes and the setpoint manipulations characterizing the optimal attack strategy are computed. An iterative greedy approach to computing attacker-defender strategies for the original nonlinear problem is proposed. These results provide guidelines for optimal security investment and defender response in preattack and postattack conditions, respectively. Index Terms-Cyber-physical systems, network security, smart grids.
I. INTRODUCTION
I NTEGRATION of distributed energy resources (DERs), such as solar photovoltaic (PV) and solar thermal power generation with electricity distribution networks (DNs), is a major aspect of smart-grid development. Some reports estimate that by 2050, solar PVs will contribute up to 23.7% of the total electricity generation in the U.S. Large-scale deployment of DERs can be utilized to improve grid reliability, reduce dependence on bulk generators (especially, during peak demand), and decrease network losses (at least up to a certain penetration level) [1] . However, harnessing these capabilities requires secure and reliable operation of cyberphysical components, such as smart inverters, DER controllers, and communication network between DERs and remote-control centers. Thus, reducing Manuscript security risks is a crucial aspect of the design and operation of DNs [2] - [6] . This paper focuses on the problem of security assessment of DNs under threats of DER node disruptions by a malicious adversary. We are specifically interested in limiting the loss of voltage regulation and the supply-demand mismatch that can result from the simultaneous compromise of multiple DERs nodes on a distribution feeder. It is well known that the active power curtailment and reactive power control are two desirable capabilities that can help maintain the operational requirements in DNs with large-scale penetration of DERs with intermittent nature [1] , [7] , [8] . We investigate the specific ways in which these capabilities need to be built into the DER deployment designs, and show that properly chosen security strategies can protect DNs against a class of security attacks.
Our work is motivated by recent progress in three topics: (T1) interdiction and cascading failure analysis of power grids (especially, transmission networks) [9] - [11] ; (T2) cyberphysical security of networked control systems [2] - [5] , [12] , [13] ; and (T3) optimal power flow (OPF) and control of distribution networks with DERs [1] , [8] , [14] .
The existing work in T1 employs state-of-the-art computational methods for solving large-scale, mixed-integer programs for the interdiction/cascade analysis of transmission networks assuming direct-current (DC) power-flow models. Since our focus is on the security assessment of DNs, we also need to model reactive power demand, in addition to the active power flows. In this paper, we consider a standard DN model with constant power loads and DERs [8] , [14] , but we restrict our attention to tree networks. This enables us to obtain structural results on optimal attack strategies. We show that these structural results also provide guidelines for investment in deploying IT security solutions, especially in geographically diverse DNs.
The adversary model in this paper considers simultaneous DER node compromises by false data injection attacks. Thanks to the recent progress in T2, similar models have been proposed for a range of cyberphysical systems [3] , [4] . Our model is motivated by the DER failure scenarios proposed by power system security experts [15] . These scenarios consider a shutdown of DER systems when an external threat agent compromises the DERs by a direct attack, or by manipulating the power generation setpoints sent from the control center to individual DER nodes/controllers; see Fig. 1 . Indeed, the security threats to DNs are real. The recent cyber attack on Ukraine's power grid shows that an external attacker can compromise multiple DN components by exploiting commonly known IT vulnerabilities [16] . Another real-world attack that is directly related to the attack model introduced in this paper was highlighted in a 2015 2325-5870 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. Congressional Research Service report [17] . This attack was conducted by computer hackers to obtain a back-door entry to the grid. They exploited the IT systems that enable integration of DERs/renewable energy sources. In our model, the attacker's objective is to impose loss of voltage regulation to the defender (i.e., network operator), and induce him to exercise load control in order to reduce the supply-demand mismatch immediately after the attack. The defender's primary concern in postattack conditions is to reduce the costs due to loss of voltage regulation and load control. Hence, in our model, the line losses are assigned a relatively lesser weight. For a fixed attack, solving for a defender response via load control and control of non-compromised DERs is similar to the recent results in (T3), that is, using convex relaxations of the OPF problem.
Our main contribution is the analysis of a three-stage sequential security game posed in Section II. In Stage 1, the defender invests in securing a subset of DER nodes but cannot ensure security of all nodes due to his or her budget constraint; in Stage 2, the resource-constrained attacker compromises a subset of vulnerable DER nodes and manipulates their setpoints; in Stage 3, the defender responds by regulating the supply-demand mismatch. This defender-attacker-defender (DAD) game models both strategic investment decisions (Stage 1) and operation of DN during the attacker-defender interaction (Stages 2-3). Solving the DAD game is a hard problem due to the nonlinear power-flow and mixed-integer decision variables.
In Section III, we provide tractable approximations of the subgame induced for a fixed defender security strategy, that is, the attacker-defender interaction in Stages 2-3; see Theorem 1. These approximations can be efficiently solved, and hold under the assumption of no reverse power flows, small impedances, and small line losses. Next, we show structural results for the master problem (i.e., optimal attack for fixed defender response), and the subproblem (i.e., optimal defender response for fixed attack). For the master problem, we derive the false setpoints that the attacker will introduce in any compromised DER (Theorem 2), and propose computational methods to solve for attack vectors, that is, DER nodes whose compromise will cause maximum loss to the defender (Propositions 3 and 4). For the subproblem, we utilize the convex relaxations of OPF to compute the optimal defender response for a fixed attack (Lemma 3), and under a restricted set of conditions, provide a range of new setpoints for the non-compromised DERs (Proposition 2). These results lead to a greedy approach, which efficiently computes the optimal attack and defender response (Algorithm 3). We prove optimality of the greedy approach for DNs with an identical resistance-to-reactance ratio (Theorem 3), and show that the approach efficiently obtains optimal attack strategy and defender response for a broad range of conditions (Section V). Thanks to the structural results on optimal attack strategy, our greedy approach has significantly better computational performance than the standard techniques to solve bilevel optimization problems (e.g., Benders decomposition [10] ). Finally, we provide a characterization of the optimal security strategy for Stage 1 decision by the defender, albeit for symmetric DNs (Section IV, Theorem 4).
In the following text, the reader should note that the proofs of Lemma 1 to 5, Proposition 1 to 6, and Theorem 4 are provided in the online supplementary material [18] .
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Distribution Network Model
We summarize the standard network model of radial electric distribution systems [8] , [19] , [20] . Consider a tree network of nodes and distribution lines G = (N ∪ {0}, E), where N denotes the set of all nodes except the substation (labeled as node 0), and let N := |N |. Let V i ∈ C denote the complex voltage at node i, and ν i := |V i | 2 denote the square of voltage magnitude. We assume that the magnitude of substation voltage |V 0 | is constant, i.e., ν 0 = 1. Let I j ∈ C denote the current flowing from node i to node j on line (i, j) ∈ E, and j := |I j | 2 the square of the magnitude of the current. A distribution line (i, j) ∈ E has a complex impedance z j = r j + jx j , where r j > 0 and x j > 0 denote the resistance and inductance of the line (i, j), respectively, and j = √ −1. The voltage regulation requirements of the DN under nominal no attack conditions govern that
where ν i = |V i | 2 and ν i = |V i | 2 are the soft lower and upper bounds for maintaining voltage quality at node i. In addition, voltage magnitudes under all conditions satisfy:
where μ and μ are the hard voltage safety bounds for any nodal voltage, and 0 < μ < min i∈N ν i max i∈N ν i < μ. 1) Load Model: We consider constant power loads [21] . 1 Let sc i := pc i + jqc i denote the power consumed by a load at node i, where pc i and qc i are the real and reactive components. . Under our assumptions, for all i ∈ N , pc i pc nom i and qc i qc nom i , i.e., the actual power consumed at each node is upper bounded by the nominal demand
(3)
2) DER Model 2 : Let sg i := pg i + jqg i denote the power generated by the DER connected to node i, where pg i and qg i denote the active and reactive power, respectively. Following [8] , [14] , sg i is bounded by the apparent power capability of the inverter, which is a given constant sp i . We denote the DER setpoint by sp i = Re(sp i ) + jIm(sp i ), where Re(sp i ) and Im(sp i ) are the real and reactive components. The power generated at each node is constrained as follows:
where S i := {sp i ∈ C | Re(sp i ) 0 and |sp i | sp i }. S := i∈N S i denotes the set of configurable setpoints.
We denote the net power consumed at node i by s i := sc i − sg i . A DN can be fully specified by the tuple G, |V 0 |, z, sc nom , sp , where z, sc nom , sp are row vectors of appropriate dimensions, and are assumed to be constant.
3) Power-Flow Equations: The three-phase balanced nonlinear power flow (NPF) on line (i, j) ∈ E is given by [19] 
where S j = P j + jQ j denotes the complex power flowing from node i to node j on line (i, j) ∈ E, andz is the complex conjugate of z; (5a) is the power conservation equation; (5b) relates the voltage drop and the power flows; and (5c) is the current-voltage-power relationship. For the NPF model (5), we define a state as follows:
where x ∈ R 2N + × C 3N , and ν, , sc, sg, and S are row vectors of appropriate dimensions. Let F denote the set of all states x that satisfy (2), (3), (4) and the NPF model (5) , and define the set of all states with no reverse power flows (see Section II-D for additional assumptions) as follows:
The linear power-flow (LPF) approximation of (5) is where x := [ ν, , sc, sg, S] is a state of the LPF model, and analogous to the NPF model, define the set of LPF states x with no reverse power flows as X .
B. Notation and Definitions
All vectors are row vectors, unless otherwise stated. For two vectors c and d, c d denotes their Hadamard product. Let K j := r j /x j be the resistance-to-reactance (r/x) ratio for line (i, j) ∈ E, and let K and K denote the minimum and maximum of the K j s over all (i, j) ∈ E. We say that DERs at nodes j and k are homogeneous with respect to each other if their setpoint configurations as well as their apparent power capabilities are identical, i.e., sp j = sp k and sp j = sp k . Similarly, two loads at nodes j and k are homogeneous if sc nom j = sc nom k . For any given node i ∈ N , let P i be the path from the root node to node i. Thus, P i is an ordered set of nodes starting from the root node and ending at node i, excluding the root node; see Fig. 2 . We say that node j is an ancestor of node k (j ≺ k), or equivalently, k is a successor of j iff P j ⊂ P k . We define the relative ordering i , with respect to a "pivot" node i as follows:
We define the common path impedance between any two nodes i, j ∈ N as the sum of impedances of the lines in the intersection of paths P i and P j , i.e., Z ij := k∈P i ∩P j z k , and denote the resistive (real) and inductive (imaginary) components of Z ij by R ij and X ij , respectively.
Finally, we define some useful terminology for the tree network G. Let H denote the height of G, and let N h denote the set of nodes on level h for h = 1, 2, . . . , H. For any node i ∈ N , h i denotes the level of node i; N c i the set of children nodes of node i; Λ i the set of nodes in the subtree rooted at node i; Λ j i the set of nodes in the subtree rooted at node i until level h j , where j ∈ Λ i ; N L the set of leaf nodes, i.e.,
C. Defender-Attacker-Defender Security Game
We consider a three-stage sequential game between a defender (network operator) and an attacker (external threat agent). The [DAD] game is a sequential game of perfect information, that is, each player is perfectly informed about the actions that have been chosen by the previous players. The equilibrium concept is the classical Stackelberg equilibrium.
In this game U B and Φ(u, ψ) denote the set of defender actions in Stages 1 and 3, respectively, and Ψ M (u) denotes the set of attacker strategies in Stage 2. Formally, the DAD game is as follows:
where (8b) specifies that the actual power consumed at node i is equal to the power demand scaled by the corresponding load control parameter γ i ∈ [γ i , 1] chosen by the defender. The constraint (8c) models the net effect of defender choice u i in Stage 1, the attacker choice (sp a i , δ i ) in Stage 2, and the defender choice sp d i in Stage 3 on the actual power generated at node i. Thus, (8c) is the adversary model of [DAD] game: the DER i is compromised if and only if it was not secured by the defender (u i = 0) and was targeted by the attacker (δ i = 1). Specifically, if i is compromised, sp i = sp a i , where sp a i = Re(sp a i ) + jIm(sp a i ) is the false setpoint chosen by the attacker. The setpoints of non-compromised DERs are governed by the defender, i.e., if DER i is not compromised sp i = sp d i . Note that the physical restriction (4) applies to all DER nodes, including the compromised ones. If the attacker's setpoint violates this constraint, it will not be admitted by the inverter as a valid setpoint. Such an attack will not affect the attack model (8c) and, consequently, it will not change the actual power generated by the DER. Also, our adversary model assumes that the DERs' power output, sg quickly attains the setpoints specified by (8c). Thus, we do not consider dynamic setpoint tracking. 3 During nominal operating conditions, the network operator minimizes the line losses due to power flow on the distribution lines (L LL ). Typical OPF formulations mainly account for this cost. However, this objective function is not representative of the loss incurred by the operator (defender) during the afore-mentioned attack on the DN. We define loss function in [DAD] as follows:
where L VR (x) and L LC (x) model the monetary cost to the defender due to the loss in voltage regulation and the cost of load curtailment/shedding (i.e., loss due to partially satisfied demand), respectively. The term denotes L LL as the total line losses. These costs are defined as follows:
The weight W i is the cost of unit voltage bound violation and C i is the cost of shedding unit load (or demand dissatisfaction) at node i, and r denotes the vector of resistances. Note that L VR is the maximum of the weighted non-negative difference between the lower bound ν i and nodal voltage square ν i . We expect that during the attack, the defender's primary concern will be to satisfy the voltage regulation requirements and minimize the inconvenience to the customers due to load curtailment. Thus, we assume that the weights W i and C i are chosen such that L LL is relatively small compared to L VR and L LC .
Note that we added the L LL (x) term in (9) primarily to ensure that the loss function L(x) remains a strictly convex function of the net demand s = sc − sg. The strict convexity allows us to have a unique solution for the inner problem for the fixed attacker's actions. In our computational study in Section V, we choose the weights W and C such that the line loss is negligible compared to L VR and L LC .
However, more generally, the loss function L(x) should reflect the monetary costs incurred by the defender in maintaining the supply-demand balance and in restoring the safe operating conditions after the attack. Such a general model will contain following terms: a) the cost of supplying additional power from the substation node to match the difference between actual power consumed by the loads and the effective DER generation (L S (x)); b) the cost due to the loss-of-voltage regulation (L VR (x)); c) the cost of curtailing or shedding certain loads (L LC (x)); d) the cost of reactive power (VAR) control and the cost of energy spillage for the non-compromised DERs (L AC (x)); and e) the costs of equipment damage due to the attack (L D (x)).
For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider L AC (x) and L D (x) in our formulation. The choice of ignoring L AC (x) can be justified if we assume that the DER owners participate in VAR control, perhaps in return of a prespecified compensation by the operator/defender. Alternatively, the DERs may be required to contribute reactive power during contingency scenarios (i.e., supply-demand mismatch during the attack). The main difficulty in modeling L D (x) is that it requires relating the state vector to the probability of equipment failures. Since our focus is on the security assessment of DNs, as opposed to network reinforcement using investment in physical protection devices, we ignore this cost in our analysis. Finally, we also ignore the contribution of L S (x) to the loss function, as it is likely to be dominated by L VR and L LC .
Stage 1 [Security Investment]:
The set of defender actions is
where B |N | denotes a security budget. Since securing a control center's communication to every DER node in a geographically diverse DN might be costly/impractical, we impose that the maximum number of nodes the defender can secure is
denote the set of secure and vulnerable nodes, for a given u. 4 There are several factors which limit the defender's ability to ensure full security of DERs. First, to ensure the security of control software and network communications that support DER operations, we need cost-effective and interoperable security solutions that can be widely adopted by different entities (e.g., DER manufacturers, service providers, and owners). Second, the DNs are likely to inherit some of the vulnerabilities of COTS IT devices that may directly or indirectly affect DER operations. Third, the defenders (operators) need to justify the business case to deploy security solutions. Existing work on security investments in such networked environments indicates that the operators tend to underestimate security risks [22] . Consequently, in the absence of proper regulatory impositions, they tend to underinvest in well-known security solutions. In our model, we capture the limitations imposed by these factors by introducing a security budget B which restricts the maximum number of nodes that the defender can secure in Stage 1. 
and M |N v | is the maximum number of DERs that the attacker can compromise. This limit accounts for the attacker's resource constraints (and/or restrict his influence based on his knowledge of DER vulnerabilities). The attacker simultaneously compromises a subset of vulnerable DER nodes by introducing incorrect setpoints [see the adversary model (8c)], and increase the loss L [see (9) ]. The attacker's choice is denoted by
where sp a denotes the vector of incorrect setpoints chosen by the attacker, and δ ∈ D M denotes the attack vector that indicates the subset of DERs compromised. A DER at node i is compromised if δ i = 1, and not compromised if δ i = 0.
We assume that the attacker has full information about the DN, i.e., she knows G, |V 0 |, z, sc nom , sp and maximum fraction of controllable load at each node. The attacker also knows the set of DERs secured by the defender in Stage 1 of the game, voltage regulation bounds, and defender's cost parameters (i.e., the weight W i for voltage bound violation and the cost of unit load shedding C i for each node i). By assuming such an informed attacker, we are able to focus on how the attacker uses the knowledge of the physical system toward achieving his or her objective. Thus, we take a conservative approach and do not explicitly consider particular mechanisms of how a security vulnerability might be exploited by the attacker. Admittedly, our attack model may be unrealistic in some scenarios; however, it allows us to identify the critical DER nodes, and characterize optimal security investment and defender response; see Section IV.
Next, we justify the attacker's resource constraint M. First, the DERs are likely to be heterogeneous in their capacity, design, and manufacturer type. The attacker may not have the specific knowledge to exploit vulnerabilities in all DER systems deployed on a DN. Second, in practice, the process of DER integration is gradual and so is the progress on implementing security solutions in the control processes that support DER operations. The attacker's capability to compromise DERs depends on how the available threat channels vary with such a technological change. Third, the security of DNs is likely to be affected by the security practices adopted by owners of DERs. For example, the attacker's capability will be limited if the DER operations are secured by a regulated distribution utility who faces compliance checks or mandatory disclosure of known incidents. In contrast, he or she is more likely to gain a backdoor entry if the DN has substantial participation from a variety of third-party DER owners who may not follow prudent security practices. In our analysis, we model the attacker's capability by introducing a parameter M, which is the maximum number of DERs that the attacker can compromise.
Stage 3 [Defender Response]:
Let γ i 0 denote the maximum permissible fraction of load control at node i, and define the set of Stage 3 defender actions
The defender chooses new setpoints sp d of non-compromised DERs and load control parameters γ i to reduce the loss L. The defender action is modeled as a vector φ := [sp d , γ] ∈ Φ(u, ψ), where sp d (respectively, γ) denotes the vector of sp d i (respectively, γ i ). We make the standard assumption that the defender knows the nominal demand (i.e., the demand in preattack conditions) using measurements collected from the DN nodes. We also assume that the defender can distinguish between compromised and non-compromised DERs. In heavy loading conditions, the defender expects the output of a non-compromised DER to lie in the first quadrant (see Fig. 4 in Section III-C), that is, it contributes positive active and reactive power to the DN. A simple technique to detect compromised DERs is whether the inverter output lies in the fourth quadrant.
D. Assumptions About the DN Model
In general, [DAD] is a nonconvex, nonlinear, trilevel optimization problem with mixed-integer decision variables. Hence, it is a computationally hard problem. Our goals are: i) to provide structural insights about the optimal attacker and defender strategies of the [DAD] game; ii) to approximate the nonlinear (hard) problem by formulating computationally tractable variants based on linear power-flow models.
To address these goals we make the following assumptions:
(A0) 0 Voltage quality: In no attack (nominal) conditions, X and X satisfy the voltage-quality bounds (1). (A0) 1 Safety: Safety bounds (2) are always satisfied, 
Furthermore, the resistances and reactances are small, i.e.,
and the common path resistances and reactances are also smaller than 1, i.e., R ii 1 and X ii 1 ∀ i ∈ N . (A0) 4 Small line losses: The line losses are very small compared to power flows, i.e., ∀x ∈ X , z 0 S, where 0 is a small positive number. 5 (A0) 0 − (A0) 1 are standard assumptions. (A0) 2 assumes that the DER penetration level is such that the net demand is always positive. In real-world DNs, r j s and x j s are typically around 0.01 (A0) 3 . Also, residential load power factors (pc j /|sc j |) are in the range of 0.88-0.95. For these values, one can show that 0 ≈ 0.05 (A0) 4 . We will denote (A0) 0 − (A0) 4 by (A0).
In addition to the aforementioned assumption, we also assume that a) the node 0 is an infinite bus; b) the voltage ν 0 is constant, and c) the system frequency is constant.
These assumptions are standard in the steady-state power flow analyses, and can be justified as follows: Our focus is on the security assessment of DNs that have substation nodes with high enough ramp rates in supplying ∼50 MW power [typical for medium-voltage (MV) substations]. That is, any supply-demand imbalance of the order of 50 MW can be cleared relatively quickly by the substation; hence, the infinite substation bus assumption.
The assumption b) is typical in OPF formulations, and we make it for the sake of mathematical convenience. Indeed, as 5 Equivalently, 0 is an upper bound on the maximum ratio of the magnitudes of line losses and power flows, i.e., 0 = max (i,j)∈E,P j =0,Q j =0 max(r j j /P j , x j j /Q j ). Thus, 0 can be determined by setting the values of loads to the corresponding nominal demands, and then computing the line losses and power flows for nominal conditions. a consequence of attack, there will be a net reduction in the substation voltage relative to the preattack value ν 0 . This effect is due to a higher net demand after Stage 3 of the game. To meet this additional demand, higher currents will flow through the distribution lines, resulting in even higher drops in the nodal voltages than what we obtained using the computational approach detailed in Section III-C. Thus, our estimate of the optimal loss is actually a lower bound on the true value of optimal loss that the defender would face when the substation voltage drops after the attack.
To justify assumption c), we argue that even large-scale penetration of DERs is not likely to achieve a generation capacity beyond 50 MW from a single DN. Even in the worst case, that is, when all DERs are simultaneously disconnected, their impact on the system frequency will be negligible.
Next, we choose as follows:
where H is the height of the tree DN and 0 is chosen as above. Now, consider another linear power-flow model (which we call the -LPF model)
and x := [ ν, , sc, sg, S] is a state of -LPF model, and X is the set of all states x with no reverse power flows. (Note that for = 0, (12) becomes (6) .)
We also note that LPF and -LPF models ignore the line losses term z j j in the power balance equation (5a), and the term |z j | 2 j in the voltage drop equation (5b). The power flows obtained by ignoring these terms approximate the nonlinear power-flow (NPF) model calculations under the assumption (A0) 3 , i.e., the line impedances are very small |z j | 1. Under the assumption (A0) 2 , that is, no reverse power flows, the LPF provides a lower bound on the line power flows, and an upper bound on the nodal voltages of the standard DistFlow model [14] , [21] . The main use of -LPF model is that it provides an upper bound on the line power flows and a lower bound on the nodal voltages; see Proposition 1 in Section III-A.
We will consider two variants of the [DAD] game (7) , (8) [ TABLE I  TABLE OF We will, henceforth, abuse the notation, and use Ψ and Φ to denote Ψ M (u) and Φ(u, ψ), respectively. For a summary of notations, see Table I .
III. ATTACKER-DEFENDER SUBGAME
In this section, we consider the subgame (Stages 2 and 3) induced by a fixed defender security strategy u in Stage 1
Analogous to the variants of [DAD], [ DAD] and [ DAD], we define two variants of the subgame [AD], [ AD] (respectively,
[ AD]) with X (respectively, X ) in (8a). The optimal losses of [ AD] and [ AD] are denoted by L u and L u ), respectively. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we focus on the case for u = 0; i.e., no node is secured by the defender in Stage 1. With further abuse of notation, for a strategy profile (0, ψ, φ), we denote x(0, ψ, φ) by x(ψ, φ) as the solution of the NPF model. Similarly, redefine x(ψ, φ) and x(ψ, φ). We also drop the superscript u from L u , L u , and L u . Fig. 3 . Outline of technical results in Section III.
Following the computational approach in the literature to solve (bilevel) interdiction problems [9] , [23] , we define the master problem [AD] a (respectively, subproblem
Similarly, define master problems and subproblems [ AD] a and 
To prove Theorem 1, we first state Lemmas 1 and 2, and Proposition 1 that relates x(ψ, φ), x(ψ, φ), and x(ψ, φ):
The following equation holds: sc = sc = sc, sg = sg = sg, and
Proposition 1: For a fixed strategy profile (ψ, φ) ∈ Ψ × Φ,
S S S, ν ν ν, .
Hence
Proposition 1 implies that any attack ψ that increases L in [ AD] (relative to the no attack case), also increases L in [AD] and L in [ AD], respectively. The converse need not be true, that is, an attack that increases L in [AD] (respectively, L in [ AD]) need not increase L in [ AD] (respectively, L in [AD]). Similarly, any defender response φ that reduces L (respectively, L), also reduces L (respectively, L). Again, the converse statements do not apply here.
Proof of Theorem 1: For any x ∈ X
Hence 
B. Optimal Defender Response to Fixed Attacker Strategy ψ.
We consider the subproblem [AD] d of computing the optimal defender response φ (ψ) for a fixed attack ψ.
The following Lemma shows that: [AD] d is a second-order cone program (SOCP) and, hence, can be solved efficiently.
Lemma 3: Let X CPF := conv (X ) denote the set of states x satisfying (2)-(4), (5a), (5b), and the relaxation of (5c):
For a fixed ψ ∈ Ψ, the problem of minimizing L(x(ψ, φ)) subject to x ∈ X CPF , (8b), (8c) is an SOCP. Its optimal solution is also optimal for [AD] d .
For a fixed ψ (attack) and fixed load control parameter γ (e.g., when changing γ is not allowed), Proposition 2 below provides a range of optimal defender setpoints sp d and sp d for LPF and -LPF models, respectively. Note that if γ is fixed, L LC ( x) is also fixed. Then, the defender setpoints can be chosen by using L VR ( x) as a loss function, instead of L( x). A similar argument holds for L( x).
Proposition 2: If we fix γ ∈ Γ in [ AD] d , then ∀i ∈ N ,
Furthermore, if the DN has identical r/x ≡ K ratio, then
Similar results hold for [ AD] d .
C. Optimal Attack Under Fixed Defender Response φ
Now, we focus on the master problem [AD] a , i.e., the problem of computing an optimal attack for a fixed defender response φ. The following Theorem characterizes the optimal attacker setpoint, denoted by sp a i = Re(sp a i ) + jIm(sp a i ), when δ i = 1 (i.e., DER at node i is targeted by the attacker).
Theorem 2: Consider [AD] a for a fixed δ ∈ D M (i.e., the DERs compromised by the attacker are specified by δ and the only decision variables in [AD] a are sp a ). Then,
The same holds for [ AD] a and [ AD] a . Proof: If δ i = 1, then pg i = pg i = Re(sp i ) = Re(sp a i ). We first prove the simpler case for [ AD] a . From (6) , one can check that as functions of pg i , P is strictly decreasing, Q is constant, and ν is strictly increasing. Hence L(ψ, φ f ) is strictly decreasing in pg i (because L VR is non-decreasing as ν is decreasing; L LC is constant). Hence, to minimize the loss L, the attacker chooses Re( sp a i ) = 0. Similarly, Im( sp a i ) = −jsp i . Similarly, we can show that in [ AD] a , sp a = 0 − jsp.
To complete the proof, we need to argue that the same conclusion (i.e., sp a = 0 − jsp) also holds for [AD] a ; we refer the reader to [18] for this argument. Fig. 4 shows the optimal attacker setpoint sp a i for δ i = 1, and the defender setpoints for the DERs for δ j = 0.
Thanks to Theorem 2, sc and sg are determined by δ and φ (since optimal sp a is given by (21)). Thus, for given (δ, φ), the loss function can be denoted as L(x([0 − jsp, δ], φ)); and [AD] can be restated as follows: (23) .
The same holds for [ AD] (respectively, [ AD]) and [ AD] a (respectively, [ AD] a ). Note that the attacker actions on DERs may not be limited to an incorrect setpoint attack. For example, the attacker can simply choose to disconnect the DER nodes by choosing sp a = 0 + 0j. However, Theorem 2 shows that the attacker will induce more loss to the defender by causing the DERs to withdraw maximum reactive power rather than simply disconnecting them. Let Δ j ( ν i ) (respectively, Δ δ ( ν i )) be the change in voltage at node i caused due to the compromise of DER at node j (respectively, compromise of DERs due to attack vector δ.) Similarly, define Δ j ( ν i ) and Δ δ ( ν i ). We now state a useful result:
For a fixed φ ∈ Φ, let D i M (φ) be the set of optimal attack vectors that maximize voltage bounds violation under LPF at a pivot node, say i. Formally
denote the set of candidate optimal attack vectors, and δ i ∈
Using Lemma 4, Algorithm 1 computes optimal δ to maximize L VR for a fixed defender action φ ∈ Φ [20] . In each iteration, the Algorithm selects one node as a pivot node. For a pivot node, say i, a set of target nodes δ i is determined by selecting M nodes with the largest Δ j ( ν i ) (see Algorithm 5 in the Appendix). By applying Lemma 4, the final nodal voltage at the current pivot node i is given by ν i − Δ δ i ( ν i ). The attack strategy that maximizes L VR is the set δ k corresponding to a pivot node k that admits maximum voltage bound violation when DERs specified by δ k are compromised. Algorithm 1 repeatedly calls procedure Algorithm 5, considering each node as the pivot node and, hence, requires O(n 2 log n) time.
Algorithm 1 Optimal Attack for the Fixed Defender Response
The following proposition argues that Algorithm 1 computes the optimal attack vectors for [ AD] a and [ AD] a .
Proposition 3: For a fixed φ ∈ Φ, if δ is the optimal attack vector computed by Algorithm 1, then δ is also an optimal attack vector of [ AD] a . The same holds for [ AD] a .
We now show that the effect of DER compromise at either node j or k on the node i depends upon the locations of nodes j and k relative to node i. The following proposition states that if node j is upstream to node k relative to the pivot node i (j ≺ i k), then the DER compromise at node k impacts ν i more than the DER compromise on node j; and if j = i k, then the effect of DER compromise at j, k on ν i is identical. Proposition 4. [20] : Consider [ AD] a . Let nodes i, j, k ∈ N where i is the pivot node, sp d j = sp d k , and sp j = sp k . If j ≺ i k (resp. j = i k), then Δ j ( ν i ) < Δ k ( ν i ) (respectively, Δ j ( ν i ) = Δ k ( ν i )). The same holds true for [ AD] a . Proposition 4 implies that broadly speaking, compromising downstream DERs is advantageous to the attacker than compromising the upstream DERs. In other words, compromising DERs by means of clustered attacks are more beneficial to the attacker than distributed attacks. Consequently, our results (see Section IV) on security strategy in Stage 1 show that the defender should utilize his or her security strategy to deter cluster attacks.
We now state a result that connects the optimal attack strategies for [ AD] a and [ AD] a .
Proposition 5: For a fixed φ ∈ Φ, the following holds:
1) The sets of candidate optimal attack vectors that maximize voltage bound violations under LPF and -LPF are identical, i.e.,
2) Furthermore, assume that ν i = ν j =: ν and W i = W j =: W ∀i, j ∈ N . Also, let the sets of optimal attack strategies for [ AD] a and [ AD] a be denoted by Ψ M (φ) and then the sets of optimal attack strategies for [ AD] a and [ AD] a are identical, i.e.,
As we will see in Section III-D, Proposition 5 forms the basis of our overall computational approach.
D. Greedy Approach for Solving [ AD], [ AD] and [AD]
We now utilize results for sub and master problems to solve [AD]. Consider the following assumption:
(A1): DN has an identical r/x ≡ K ratio, i.e., ∀j ∈N, K j = K.
In this subsection, we present an algorithm to solve [ AD] and [ AD] under (A0) and (A1), and then propose its extension, a greedy iterative approach, for solving [AD] under the general case.
Under (A0) and (A1), the optimal defender setpoints sp d and sp d are as specified by Proposition 2 and, hence, fixed. For fixed optimal sp d (respectively, sp d ), we can solve the problem [ AD] (respectively, [ AD]) by using the Benders Cut method [23] . However, we present a computationally faster algorithm-Algorithm 2 that computes the attacker's candidate optimal attack vectors D M (respectively, D M ) using Lemma 4. 2 4: Proof: Under (A1) sp d = sp d is fixed (Proposition 2). Then, for any γ ∈ Γ, by Lemma 5 and Proposition 3, the optimal attack δ belongs to the set D M ( sp d ). Algorithm 2 iterates over the attack vectors δ ∈ D M , computes γ (δ) by solving an LP and calculates the loss L( x(δ, φ (δ))). Finally, it returns the solution corresponding to the maximum loss. Similar logic applies for optimal solution of [ AD].
We now describe an iterative greedy approach to computing the solution to [AD] that uses the optimal attacker strategy for the fixed defender response (refer Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 3 initializes φ c to the optimal defender response under no attack. In the first step of the iterative approach, the attacker assumes some defender response φ c to be fixed, and computes the optimal attack strategy δ c (φ c ) using the greedy Algorithm 1. Then, in the second step, the defender computes a new defense strategy φ c optimal for fixed δ c by solving the SOCP and updates the defender response. If L(x(δ c , φ c )) > L(x(δ , φ )), then the current best solution (δ , φ ) is updated to (δ c , φ c ). Then in the next iteration, the attacker uses this new defender response to update his or her attack strategy, and so on and so forth. If this δ c has already been discovered in some previous iteration, the algorithm terminates successfully, with δ , φ as the required optimal attack plan, and the corresponding optimal defense. The algorithm terminates unsuccessfully if the number of iterations exceeds a maximum limit. Note that in each iteration, the size of Υ increases by 1; hence, the algorithm is bound to terminate after exhausting all possible attack vectors.
Proposition 5 and Theorem 3 can be applied for any u ∈ U B since if the DN has an identical r/x ratio, sp d are also fixed.
Our overall computational approach to solving the problem [AD] thus far, can be summarized as in Fig. 5 . Given an instance of the problem [AD], we first solve the problems [ AD] and [ AD] . For this, we employ an iterative procedure that iterates between the master problems and subproblems. For a fixed attacker action, we determine the optimal defender response φ for the [AD] d using the convex relaxation of (5c). Then, for the fixed defender response φ, we compute the optimal attacker strategies ψ and ψ by solving [ AD] a and [ AD] a , respectively. Proposition 5 provides us with a useful result that ψ (φ) := ψ = ψ . This optimal attacker strategy ψ (φ) is then fed back to the master problem [AD] a . This procedure is repeated until we reach a convergence or we exceed the maximum iteration limit.
IV. SECURING DERS TO WORST-CASE ATTACKS
In this section, we consider the defender problem of optimal security investment in Stage 1. For simplicity, we restrict our attention to DNs that satisfy the following assumption:
(A2) Symmetric Network: For every i ∈ N , for any two nodes j, k ∈ N c i , Λ j and Λ k are symmetrically identical about node i. That is, z j = z k , |N c j | = |N c k |, sc nom j = sc nom k , ν j = ν k , W j = W k , and C j = C k . However, all of the DERs are homogeneous, i.e., ∀j, k ∈ N , sp j = sp k .
Let B be a fixed security budget. Let u, u ∈ U B , u = u, be two security strategies. Strategy u is more secure than strategy u (denoted by u u) under NPF (respectively, LPF), if L u L u (respectively, L u L u ). Finally, we ask what is the best security strategy u , such that for u = u , L u is minimized. Fig. 6 shows two possible security strategies u 1 [Fig. 6(a) ] and If we compare u 1 and u 2 , while transitioning from u 1 to strategy u 2 , 3 secure nodes in Λ 2 subtree go up a level each, while three secure nodes in Λ 3 subtree go down a level each. Then, between u 1 and u 2 , which strategy is more secure? In this section, we provide insights about optimal security strategies under (A2), which help show that u 2 is more secure than u 1 .
Algorithm 4 computes an optimal security strategy [ DAD] under (A0)-(A2). It initially assigns all nodes to be vulnerable. Finally, we state the following result: Proposition 6: 1) Under (A0), (A1), (A2), D M can be partitioned into, at most, |N v | N equivalence classes of attack vectors, one for each vulnerable node considered as a pivot node. Any two attack vectors in the same equivalence class has an identical impact on the corresponding pivot node. In addition, any two equivalence classes can be considered homomorphic transformations of each other.
2) Under (A0), (A1), if ∀i, j, k ∈ N such that sp j > 0 and sp k > 0, Δ j ( ν i ) = Δ k ( ν i ), then | D M | = |N v |, that is, if for any pivot node, no two DERs have an identical impact on the pivot node due to their individual DER compromises, then each equivalence class is a singleton set and, hence, the set of candidate optimal attack vectors is, at most, of size |N v |.
By Theorem 4, we can compute the optimal security investment u in O(N ), and by Proposition 6, for fixed u , we can compute the optimal attacker strategy ψ in O(N ). Finally, for fixed u and ψ , we can compute the optimal defender response φ in O(poly(N )). Hence, we can compute the optimal solution for [ DAD], in O(poly(N )). The same holds for [ DAD].
Admittedly, our structural results on optimal security investment in Stage 1 of the game are specific to assumption (A2). Future work involves extending these results to a general radial DN with heterogeneous DER nodes. A key aspect in the effort will be to understand how the defender's net value of securing an individual DER node depends on its capacity and location in the DN.
V. COMPUTATIONAL STUDY
We describe a set of computational experiments to evaluate the performance of the iterative Greedy Approach (GA) in solving [AD]; see Algorithm 3. We again assume u = 0. We compare the optimal attack strategies and optimal defender setpoints obtained from GA with the corresponding solutions obtained by conducting an exhaustive search (or Brute Force (BF)), and by implementing the Benders Cut (BC) algorithm. We refer the reader to [9] , [23] , for the BC algorithm adopted here. The abbreviations BC-LPF and BC-NPF denote the solutions obtained by applying optimal attack strategies from [ AD] to the LPF and NPF, respectively. Importantly, the experiments illustrate the impact of the attacker's resource (M) and defender's load control capability γ on the optimal value of [AD]. The code for this computational study can be obtained by contacting the authors.
Network Description: Our prototypical DN is a modified IEEE 37-node network; see Fig. 1 . We consider two variants of this network: homogeneous and heterogeneous. The homogeneous network (G I ) has 14 homogeneous DERs with randomly assigned node locations, loads with equal nominal demand, and lines with an identical r/x ratio. Each line has an impedance of z j = (0.33 + 0.38j)Ω. The nominal demand at each node i is sc nom i = 15 kW + j4.5 kvar. The apparent power capability of each DER node i is sp i = 11.55 kVA. The nominal voltage at node 0 is |V 0 | = 4 kV. The cost of load control is C = 7 $ per killowat. The heterogeneous network (G H ) has the same topology as G I but has heterogeneous DERs (chosen at random from three different DER apparent power capabilities), heterogeneous loads, and lines with different r/x ratios. The locations of DER nodes, the total nominal generation capacity, and the total nominal demand in G H is roughly similar to the corresponding values for G I .
DER output versus M. Fig. 7 compares the DER output (sg) of non-compromised DERs that form part of the defender response in G I and G H for different M. When M = 0 (no attack), there are no voltage violations, and the defender minimizes L LL , which results in pg > qg. For M > 0, the voltage bounds may be violated. To limit L VR , the defender responds by increasing qg; and the output of non-compromised DERs lie in a neighborhood of θ = arccot r/x. For the case of G H [Fig. 7(b) ], the setpoints of the non-compromised DERs are more spread out to achieve voltage regulation over different r/x ratios (Proposition 2). In Fig. 7(b) , the three semicircles correspond to the non-compromised DERs with different apparent power capabilities. These observations on the defender response validate Proposition 2.
GA vs. BC-NPF, BC-LPF and BF. Fig. 8 compares results obtained from BC-NPF, GA, and BF on G I . We consider two cases with the maximum controllable load percentage γ = 50% and γ = 70%. For each case, we vary M from 0 to |N v | = 14; and vary W/C ratios to capture the effect of different weights on the terms L VR and L LC .
In our study, we chose C i = 7 cents/kWh, converted appropriately to the per unit system. 6 The ratio W/C = 2 roughly corresponds to the maximum W/C ratio for which the defender does not exercise load control because the cost of doing load control is too high, that is, at optimum defender response γ = 1 N . In contrast, W/C = 18 roughly corresponds to the minimum W/C ratio for which the defender exercises maximum load control (i.e., γ = γ). We also consider an intermediate ratio W/C = 10.
L versus M. Both L VR and L LC are zero when there is no attack. As M increases, one or both L VR and L LC start increasing. This indicates that as more DERs are compromised, the defender incurs L VR , and in addition, he or she imposes load control to better regulate the DN. Indeed, after the false setpoints (Theorem 2) are used to compromise DERs, the net load in the DN increases. Without load control, the voltages at some nodes drop below the lower bounds, increasing L VR . Hence, the defender exercises load control and changes the setpoints of non-compromised DERs to limit the total loss. Perhaps a more interesting observation is that as M increases, L LC first increases rapidly but then flattens out [ Fig. 8(c) and (d) ]. This can be explained as follows: depending on the W/C ratio, there is a subset of downstream loads that are beneficial in terms of the value that the defender can obtain by controlling them. That is, if the loads belonging to this subset are controlled, the decrease in L VR outweighs the increase in L LC , hence, the defender imposes load control on these downstream loads to reduce the total loss. In contrast, controlling the loads outside this subset increases L LC more than the decrease in L VR . Hence, the defender satisfies the demand at these loads fully. The L LC increases until load control capability in the subset of beneficial downstream loads to the defender is fully exhausted. The size of this subset depends on the W/C ratio. The higher the ratio, the larger the size of the subset of the loads beneficial to the defender. Hence, the value of M, at which the L LC cost curve flattens out, increases as the W/C ratio increases.
The cost curve for L VR also shows interesting behavior as the number of compromised DER nodes increases [ Fig. 8(a) and (b) ]. The marginal increase in L VR for every additional DER compromised reduces as M increases. This observation can be explained by the fact that the attacker prefers to compromise downstream nodes over upstream ones (Proposition 4). Initially, the attacker is able to rapidly increase L by compromising more beneficial downstream nodes. However, as the downstream nodes are eventually exhausted, the attacker has to target the relatively less beneficial upstream nodes. Hence, there is the reduction in a marginal increase of L VR .
In L VR plots, for small M, W/C = 2 curves are lower than the W/C = 10 curves which, in turn, are lower than the W/C = 18 curves. But, for larger M, this order reverses. The M where these lines cross each other decreases, as the γ increases [see Fig. 8 (a) and (b)]. The reason is for some intermediate value of M, the defender exhausts the load control completely, and then the L increases at rates in the same order of increasing W/C values.
Our computational study also validates that the GA is more efficient than the BC method because GA calculates the exact impact that the DER compromises will have on a pivot node. In contrast, BC overestimates the impact of DER compromises that are not the ancestors to the pivot nodes. Therefore, the feasible region probed by BC at every iteration is larger than the feasible region probed in the corresponding iteration of GA. Hence, although GA converges to a solution in 2-3 iterations, BC, in most cases, does not converge to the optimal solution even in 200 iterations.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We focused on the security assessment of radial DNs for an adversary model in which multiple DERs (in this case, DER nodes) are compromised. The adversary can be a threat agent, who can compromise the operation of DERs, or a malicious insider in the control center. We considered a composite loss function that primarily accounts for the attacker's impact on voltage regulation and induced load control. The security assessment problem is formulated as a three-stage DAD sequential game. Our main technical contributions include: 1) approximating the [DAD] game that has a nonlinear power-flow model and mixed-integer decision variables with tractable formulations based on linear power flow and 2) characterization of structural properties of security investments in Stage 1 and the optimal attack in Stage 2 (i.e., the choice of DER node locations and the choice of false setpoints).
Future work includes: 1) extending Theorems 1 and 2 to cases where reverse power flows are permissible (e.g., when the DN is not under heavy loading conditions and the attacker can cause DER generation to exceed the demand and 2) designing greedy algorithm to solve [AD] and proving optimality guarantees of Theorems 3 and 4 for DNs with heterogeneous r/x ratio, and heterogeneous DERs or loads.
Finally, note that we do not consider cascading failures in this paper. However, our analysis can be extended to a form of cascading failures within DNs reported by Kundu and Hiskens [25] . They study synchronous tripping of the loads (specifically, plug-in electric vehicles chargers) leading to overvoltages in the DN. Our result on optimal DER attack can be used to create voltage violations at some nodes. If these violations are too high, certain loads may start to trip. After a sufficiently large number of loads trip, the attacker can further manipulate the DER setpoints to their maximum power generation capacity. In the absence of new loads, this may lead to overvoltages, as described in [25] .
APPENDIX
For a pivot node i ∈ N , Algorithm 5 computes a sequence of sets of nodes in decreasing order of Δ j ( ν i ) values. This sequence is used to compute the optimal attacks that maximize voltage bounds violation at node i. 
